Abstract
Examinations of mixed oligopolies, in which social surplus-maximizing public firms compete against profit-maximizing private firms, have become increasingly popular in recent years. For pioneering works on mixed oligopolies, see [2] , [5] . Excellent surveys can be found in [1] , [6] .
The interest in mixed oligopolies is high because of their importance in economies of Europe (Germany, England and others), Canada and Japan. There are examples of mixed oligopolies in United States such as the packaging and overnight-delivery industries. Mixed oligopolies are also common in the East European and former Soviet Union transitional economies, in which competition among public and private firms exists or still exists in many industries such as banking, house loan, airline, telecommunication, natural gas, electric power, hospital, health care, railways and others.
These situations have been investigated in different ways. Many works analyzed Cournot and Stackelberg models with the role of each firm given exogenously. However, it is more reasonable to assume that each firm decides what actions to take and when to take them.
DeFraja and Delbono [1] are pioneers in these kinds of works. They showed that in simultaneous-move games, privatization of the public firm may improve welfare. In the paper by Matsumura [4] , the author investigates mixed duopoly and analyzes a desirable role (either leader or follower) of the public firm, when the inverse demand function ( ( ( ( ) ) ) ) G p p = = = = is concave. Under these conditions, Matsumura founds that the role of he public firm should be that of the leader. Matsumura also establishes the domestic social surplus in a mixed duopoly is greater than in a monopolistic market.
We want to examine the desirable role of the domestic public firm. In contrast to [4] , here we consider an inverse demand function convex. In this case the role of the domestic public firm could be the leader or the follower, this role depends on the reaction function of private foreign firm.
In section 2, the model is described. We demonstrate theorems of existence and uniqueness in the Cournot problem. We define the concept of a strong firm and a weak firm. These definitions are based on the reaction function of every firm at the Cournot equilibrium.
Section 3 deals with the game where the domestic public firm is the leader and the private foreign firm is the follower. The private foreign firm will always be a weak firm.
Section 4 considers the game where the domestic public firm is the follower and the private foreign firm is the leader. The domestic public firm may have two different types of optimal reaction at the Cournot equilibrium, and as a consequence this firm could be weak or strong. The paper is finished with Conclusion.
The Model Specification
Consider two firms producing a homogeneous product. Let G represent the total output, and ( ( 
i i q f stand for the production cost by firm i . Let G be the total output; i. e. (1) Firm 1 is a foreign private firm, which maximizes its own profits and firm 2 is a domestic public firm which maximizes domestic social surplus. Domestic social surplus S is the sum of consumer surplus and profits of firm 2: . (2) The profit of firm 1 is given by:
(3) We accept the following assumptions concerning the price function and cost functions:
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Examples of functions that satisfy A1, A3 and A4 are: ( (
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Lemma 1.
Under assumptions A1 and A2, firm 1's profits function 
. On the other hand, firm i is called weak if its reaction function's derivative has a non-positive value at the Cournot equilibrium:
In other words, firm i is strong if it is ready to increase its production volume beyond its Cournot optimal response value even if the price is going down. Otherwise, firm i is a weak firm. Now we accomplish a comparative analysis for various strategies of the firms. We are going to compare the volume of the Cournot equilibrium . Also we compare the domestic social surplus of domestic firm and the profits of private firm.
Leadership of the Domestic (Public) Firm
First, we consider the game where firm 2 (public one) is the leader. This corresponds to the agents' strategies selected as follows:
. In other words, firm 2 chooses 2 q and firm 1 (the private one) chooses 1 q after observing 2 q , so as to maximize its net profit ( (
be the reaction function of firm 1; that is, the value that satisfies:
.
By the strict convexity of the cost function 1 f and by assumption A3, this reaction function is well-defined.
Lemma 3. Under assumptions A1 -A4, ||||
Moreover, ( 
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. Definition 3 . Now we recall that the Stackelberg equilibrium (with the domestic firm as a leader and the foreign firm as a follower) is the vector
Now we establish relationships to compare the production volumes of the firms at the Stackelberg equilibrium (11) -(13) with those at the Cournot equilibrium defined by the complementarity problem 
Under assumptions A1 -A4, the following estimates hold: 
, because assumptions A1 -A4 in general do not imply the (strict) concavity of the leader's (domestic social surplus) function
. Now we introduce an additional assumption which allows one to establish this concavity of the domestic social surplus function and hence deduce more exact global comparative static results making use of some local information only.
A5. Assume that the foreign firm's cost function is linear:
where
is a constant, and the inverse demand function has the following property: the ratio
, and the following estimate holds: 
is strictly convex over 0 ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ Q . Now we obtain the complete comparison static classification for the above particular case. 
This case can occur only at the point
(ii) If
Leadership of the Foreign (Private) Firm
Now consider the game where firm 1 (foreign private firm) is the leader. ( (
here, as previously,
G q 2 be the reaction function of firm 2; that is, the quantity that satisfies the condition below: 
In what follows we establish relationships which allow one to compare the production volumes of the market players at the Stackelberg equilibrium (23) - (25) 
Under assumptions A1 -A4, the following relationships are valid:
Remark 3. Due to the property
(27) Therefore, the leadership of the private firm is better for the individual consumer than the Cournot competition between the private and public producers, as the former may bring to a lower retail price of the good at the market.
Conclusions
The paper extends the results of existence and uniqueness of the conjectural variations equilibrium at oligopolistic markets with homogeneous product and similar agents (using profit functions of the same structure with probably different parameters) to the duopoly of agents with essentially distinct object functions. One of the competitors is a foreign firm maximizing her expected profit, whereas the second agent is a domestic firm aiming at maximizing the social surplus. This diversity of the competitors' targets makes the investigation more complex as in the case of homogeneous agents, but it allows one to obtain new interesting results concerning the comparative static between the Cournot and Stackelberg formulations of the model. To do that, we introduce the concepts of weak and strong firms, in dependence of their reaction functions and show that the domestic social surplus is higher if the leader is strong than when the leader is weak.
In this paper we prove that, if the inverse demand function is convex, the domestic public firm is follower and private public firm could be strong or weak. These results complement those obtained by Matsumura [4] who demonstrate that if the demand function is concave the domestic public firm is strong and private firm is always weak.
